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Article 5

Artificial Nutrition and Hydration:
Recent Changes in Understanding
Obligations
by
Mr. Scott A. McConnaha
The author is a communication specialist at the national headquarters of
the Catholic Health Association of the United States, in St. Louis, and is
pursuing a master's degree in moral theology at Saint Louis University. He
is formerly a reporter for the Catholic Herald, the newspaper of the
Archdiocese of Milwaukee.

The current case involving Terri Schiavo, a Florida woman whom
doctors have determined has been in a persistent vegetative state (PVS)
since 1990, has sparked renewed interest in the ethical issues surrounding the
use of artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH). The Schiavo situation not
only reveals the difficulty involved in choosing whether to discontinue a
patient's ANH, but also the bitter divisiveness that sometimes accompanies
the controversy over the moral justifiability of withdrawing ANH.
"By the rules of war and the Geneva Convention such actions death by starvation - would be harshly condemned and puni shable
in an international court," said Judie Brown, president of the
American Life League, a pro-life organization that purports
alignment with the magisterium of the Catholic Church .!
Mary Ann Kreitzer, president of the Catholic Media Coalition,
said ''The euthanasia murder of Terri Schindler Schiavo by starvation
and dehydration ... is a violation of her right to life and a crime
against humanity."2
"We 're delighted that the president [George W. Bush] supported
his brother's [Florida Governor Jeb Bush] position that Terri Schiavo
should not be starved," said Burke Balch, director of the Robert
Powell Center for Medical Ethics, an affiliation of the National Right
to Life Committee. 3
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These are impassioned words iss ued by seemingly powerful
organizations. Such remarks may lead some to think that a decision to
remove ANH from a loved one's care is immoral and contrary to Catholic
Church teaching. Is it?
The purpose of this di sc uss ion is not to propose a solution to the
Schiavo case, rather, it is to address one aspect of the current controversy
that has sparked renewed interest: the Church 's stance on the use and
remova l of ANH. Health care providers at Catholic institutions, patients,
family members, and others charged with their care, look to Church
teaching for guidance on medical moral matters. Prolonging life through
ANH is one topic that has certainly been addressed by the magi sterium and
other Church bodies. But is there continuity between the Church's recent
statements and the moral tradition ?
To begin thi s di scussion, I will present the current Catholic Church
position on the moral justifiability of withholding ANH from such patients
as those in a PYS . Thi s will be followed by some arguments made by
contemporary moral theologians who question these more recent Church
teachings. Following that, I will lay out the historical developments of this
ethical issue, the origins of which contemporary theologians cite when
making their case.

The Last 20 Years
When a situation calling for the consideration of the removal of ANH
- commonly known as tube feeding - presents itself, patients who are
able to participate in the decision-making process, or the loved ones
responsible for making the decision by proxy, are seldom in a situation
where the answer is uncontestedly " no, you should not remove the feeding,"
or "yes, you should remove the feeding." The difficulty of making this
decision is by no means alleviated by Church pronouncements over the past
two decades.
For guidance on moral medical iss ues, Catholic health care
institutions in the United States rel y on a collection of directives
promulgated by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB)
called the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care
Services (ERDs). In the most recent edition of the ERDs, the USCCB
acknowledges the need for further reflection on "the morality of
withdrawing medically assisted hydration and nutrition from a person who
is in the condition that is recognized by physicians as the ' persistent
vegetative state ' (PYS)."4 This same acknowledgement of the U.S. bishops
appeared in their earlier publication of Nutrition and Hydration: Moral
and Pastoral Reflections. s
Despite the call for further reflection , the U.S . bi shops do offer a
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certain level of guidance here. "There should be a presumption in favor of
providing nutrition and hydration to all patients, including patients who
require medically assisted nutrition and hydration , as long as thi s is of
sufficient benefit to outweigh the burde ns involved to the patient."6 Some
maintain that this directi ve " reflects a way of reasoning known as
tutiorism. Tutiori sm holds that, in cases of doubt , one acts responsibly
when the safer course is followed ."7
"Tutiorism should not degenerate into rigori sm," however,s and there
are signs that recent Church teaching on ANH for PVS patients has done just
that. In 198 1, The Pontifical Council on Health Affairs said "There remains
the strict obligation to apply under all circumstances those therapeutic
measures which are called ' minimal ' : that is, those which are norm ally and
customarily used for the maintenance of life (alime ntation, blood
transfusion s, injections, etc.) . To interrupt these minimal measures would,
in practice, be equivalent to wishing to put an end to the patient's life."9
Four years later, the Pontifical Academy of Sciences reiterated this
unde rstanding more ex plicitly : " If the patient is in a permanent coma,
irreversible as far as it is possible to predict, treatment is not required, but
all care should be lavished on him including feeding .. .. If treatment is of
no benefit to the patient, it may be withdrawn, while continuing with the
care of the patient."lo
Di stinguishing between treatment and care has become an important
point in debates on the use of ANH for PVS patients because of Church
statements that permit the rernoval of interventions deemed burdensome.
In 1992, for instance, the U.S. bi shops said " Such measures mu st not be
withdrawn in order to cause death , but they may be withdrawn if they offer
no reasonable hope of sustaining life or pose excessive ri sks or burdens." II
With the Vatican clearly on their side, bishops ofthe New Jersey State
Catholic Conference said in 1987, " that nutrition and hydration , being
basic to human life, are aspects of normal care, which are not excessively
burde nsome, and should always be provided to a patient." 12 Writing on
be half of Nancy Jobes, a severely brain damaged woman w hose hu sband
sought to re move her ANH, the New Jersey bi shops said nutrition and
hydration are not a form of medical treatment. Medical treatment is for
curing di sease. Nutrition and hydration are for sustaining life. " For that
fundamental reason we insist that nutrition and hydration must always be
maintained."13
The Catholic bishops of Pennsy lvania express a simil ar viewpoint as
that of the New Jersey bishops:
The feeding - regardless of whether it be considered as treatment or
as care - is serving a li fe-sustaining purpose. Therefore, it remains
an ordinary means of sustai ning li fe and should be continued. In
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othe r wo rds, the me re di stinc tion between treatme nt a nd care does
not of itself resolve the mo ral problem. R athe r. its resolution still
re mains wit hin the scope of the usual norms of o rdinary and
ex traord inary means. Whether it is viewed as treatment o r care. it
wo uld be morall y wro ng to discontinue nutriti o n a nd hyd rati on when
they are w ithin the realm of o rdinary means. l~

Classifying ANH as treatment or care therefore becomes
unnecessary, according to the bishops of Pennsylvania. All that matters is
that ANH is an ordinClf), means of sustaining life, and therefore should not
be removed. The Pennsylvani a bi shops define ordinary means as "those
which are available and do not require effort , suffering or expense beyond
th at whi ch most people would consider appropriate in a serious
situation ."" While the U.S. bi shops' Committee for Pro-Life Activities did
say ANH has not been defi nitive ly dee med "normal [ordinary] care" by the
magisterium , and that the iss ue surrounding the obligation of providing
AN H is unresolved, it contends "th at while legitimate Catholic moral
debate continues , deci sions about these patients should be guided by a
pres umpti on in favor of medi call y ass isted nutritio n and hydration ." 16
In 1998, Pope John Paul II made a statement that supports the pro-life
committee's position cited above.
As ecumenical witness in defense of life develops, a great teaching
effort is needed to clari fy the substantive mo ral diffe re nce betwee n
discontinuing med ical procedures that may be burdensome,
dangerous or dispro porti o nate to the expected o utcome - what the
Catec hi sm of the Catholic Church call s " the refusal of 'overzealo us'
treatment" (No. 2278 ; cf. Evangelium Vitae 65) - and taking away
the o rdin ary means of preserving life such as feed ing, hydration and
normal med ical care. The statement of the U.S. bishops ' pro-li fe
committee, " Nutritio n and Hydratio n: Moral and Pastoral
Conside ratio ns," rightly e mphasizes that the omi ssio n of nutriti o n
and hydra ti o n intended to cause a patient 's death must be rejected
and th at. while givi ng careful consideratio n to all fac tors involved.
the presLimptio n sho uld be in favor of providing medicall y assisted
nutrition and hydration to all pati ents who need them. To blur thi s
di stinction is to introduce a source of countless injustices and much
add iti o nal a ng ui sh. 17

On March 20, 2004, following an international conference sponsored
by the Pontifical Academy for Life and the World Federation of Catholic
Medical Associations (FIAMC), the pope made hi s stance even clearer. He
emphasized that nutrition and hydration, regardless of how they are
admini stered, are "a natural means of preserving life, not a medical
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procedure. Therefore, their use must be considered ordinary and
appropriate and as such, morally obligatory."1 8
John Paul II very explicitly places ANH directly in the category of
ordinary care, the administration of which is to be presumed. This
essentially brings to fruition a trend in Church positioning that has been
growing since the early 1980s. Contemporary theologians, however, are
not so sure this is consistent with the moral tradition.

Contemporary Theologians
A 1986 document of the U.S. Catholic bi shops sums up the current
Church understanding of the administration of nutrition and hydration for
all patients:
Because human life has inherent value and dignity regardless of its
condition, every patient should be provided with measures which can
effectively preserve life without involving too grave a burden. Since
food and water are necessities of life for all human beings and can
generally be provided without the risks and burden s of more
aggressive mean s for sustai ning life, the law should establi sh a strong
presumption in favor of their use. 19

Though "food and water" generally refers to naturally administered
food and drink, the statement above has been used to classify ANH in two
distinctly important ways: 1) it is an ordinary means of sustaining life that
2) causes benefit (namely the prolongation of biological life) rather than
burden. Current arguments over these two points are what fuel much of the
furor surrounding cases like that of M s. Schiavo. If ANH is understood as
an ordinary means of sustaining life and it offers sufficient benefit over
potential burdens, then, according to the tradition, its use would be morally
obligatory.
Kevin O ' Rourke, OP, refutes this notion that ANH is an ordinary
means that offers benefit to PVS patients. "The medical community has
decided without equivocation that ANH is a medical therapy and may
therefore be withdrawn from PVS patients because it is not beneficial."20
He goes on to explain that arguing against the removal of ANH because it
causes suffering and starvation is groundless: "PVS patients have no
sensory capacity, they feel no pain as a result of withdrawal of ANH.
Moreover, though death is foreseen, it need not be the direct intention of
withdrawal. Rather, the direct intention of withdrawing ANH is simply to
discontinue futile therapy."2 1This last point is crucial because all involved
agree that any action done specifically to cause death is considered
euthanasia, and that is clearly illicit.
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The contention that removing ANH does not cause a patient's death is
supported by Lisa Sowle Cahill. "To omit to provide extraordinary life
support to a patient is not to directly cause his death, but to permit it to
occur as a result of di sease."l1 She continues by explaining that the decision
to remove life support is not done to kill the patient, but because in the
cun'ent, unchanging state, the patient no longer possesses "the sufficient
conditions for the fruitful development of loving relationships, both with
other humans, and through them, with God."23
In other words, when ANH offers no hope of benefit, or has been
deemed burdensome to the PYS patient or those closest to him, its removal
is licit because continuing to provide nutrition and hydration "would
impede the [patient 's] response of love to God."2-l Individual s are "able to
love God in the context of human life through loving others as
[themselves]. Yet human life is not itself an absolute good. The good of life
is a limited good preci sely because it is the basis for pursuing the higher,
more important spiritual goods of life (love of God and love of neighbor). 25
Reacting to the Pennsylvania bi shops ' statement, Richard
McCormick said traditional Catholic moral teachjng "maintains that life is
a basic good but not an absolute one and that, therefore, not all means must
be used to preserve it. .. Artificial nutrition-hydration that 'si mply puts off
death by maintaining physical existence with no hope of recovery ... is
useless and therefore not ethically obligatory."'26 Essentially, he is saying
that life on earth is not to be regarded as an ultimate end, and to speak in
such terms denies the fact that sometimes patients should be allowed to die.
McCormick is arguing from the same standpoint as O ' Rourke, Cahill ,
and numerous other contemporary moral theologians.27 ANH for the
accurately diagnosed PYS patient does not fall within the realm of ordinary
means that offers benefi t, its removal is not the cause of death, and its
continuation is an unfortunate impediment to the patient's greater
fulfillment. These are not new ideas. Moral theologians today, when
reacting to recent Church statements on ANH and the care of PYS patients,
appeal to a well-established theological tradition that goes back nearly 800
years.

Development of the Tradition
When Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274), the "Angelic Doctor," says that
a person is "bound to nouri sh his body ... and to all the other items without
which the body can not live,"28 it might be inferred that he believes " we
have an absolutely binding obligation to take every step necessary for the
preservation of one's life."29 A qualification of sorts appears, however, in
his Summa where he addresses the question of whether one's fearlessness
can be considered a sin.
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It is inbred for a man to love his own life and those things which
contribute to it, but in due measure ; that is, to love things of thi s kind
not as though his goal were set in them , but inasmuch as they are to
be used for his final end . .. So it is possible for someone to fear death
and other temporal evils less than he should . .. Temporal goods ought
to be despised in so far as they hinder us from love and fear of God ...
But temporal goods are not to be despised in so far as they are helpful
means of attaining things which promote fear and love of God .30

Simply put, individuals are obliged to take care of themselves, but
must be wary of letting the objects of this care, and even their lives on
earth, become the primary goal of existence. (By no means, however, is he
degrading life or calling for a happy pursuit of death.) Ultimately, each is to
use his life for the pursuit of God. This is about as far as one can apply
Aquinas to the topic at hand, but it is quite important nonetheless. In the
above quote from question 126 of the "Secunda Secundre," he opens the
door for future theologians to explore the notions of ordinary/extraordinary
means, burden/benefit, and love of God as the fulfillment of life.
One theologian from the sixteenth century is held up by moralists as
the father of nutrition and hydration discussions regarding obligations in
the preservation of life. Francisco de Vitoria (1486-1546), a Spanish
Dominican, makes first mention of the usefulness of food in his
Relectiones Theologicce. It is here that he presents a qualification to
Aquinas's proposition that to act against the natural inclination to preserve
one's life is a mortal sin. "If this is so, then it would seem that a sick person
who does not eat because of some disg ust of food would be guilty of a sin
equivalent to suicide."3l
Chief among Vitoria's points on this matter is that "a sick person is
required to take food if there exists some hope of life."32 Exceptions are
made for the patient who simply cannot bring himself to eat or drink. "If
the patient is so depressed or has lost his appetite so that it is only with the
greatest effort that he can eat food , thi s right away ought to be reckoned as
creating a kind of impossibility and the patient is excused, at least from
mortal sin, especially if there is little or no hope of life."33
He is not condoning self-inflicted starvation as a means of suicide,
nor is he allowing "much leeway if the means (food) are effective (a certain
"hope of life") and do not involve a grave burden ... Clearly, Vitoria
recognizes psychic as well as physiological illness, and his notion of grave
burden involves more than physical pain ."34
For Vitoria, food and drink are natural means for preserving life.
Drugs, on the other hand, are unnatural. His distinction between the two
means is somewhat ambivalent, though. Food is more obligatory because it
is simply a natural necessity for life; drugs are less obligatory simply
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because they are never always necessary or natural. "But on the other hand,
medicine is also intended by nature for health. It would see m, then, that
medicine is also natural."35
Theologian Daniel Cronin, STD, Archbishop Emeritus of Hartford,
CT, raises an important point that helps clarify Vitoria's apparent
indecisiveness about the natural and unnatural nature of drugs: "Drugs and
medicines are not the basic way by which man is to nourish hi s life ... If
man were never to be sick, he would never need medicines. If he is sick,
however, it is quite natural for him to make use of artificial means of
conserving life."36 Thi s is the first inkli ng of the ordinary/extraordinary
means di stinction to appear more substantively in the years to come.
So for Vitoria, food and drink are a natural , necessary means of
preserving life, but, like drugs , are not obligatory when their administration
causes grave burden and offers no hope of benefit for the patient. Simply
put, there can be circumstances, regarding the use of nutrition and
hydration, where one is not morall y obligated to preserve life. It is
impOJ1ant to note that Vitoria lived at a time when the only way nutrition
and hydration could be administered was through the mouth . If he allowed
for circumstances when food and drink could licitly be declined, how
much more so for tube feeding?
In the century following Vitoria, numerous theologians continued to
address the issue of obligations in preserving life. The terms ordinary and
extraordinary are in fact first applied to this di scussion in 1595 by
Dominican theologian Domingo Banez (1528-1604). At a time when
anesthesia was so plimitive that it gave little relief from the pain of surgery,
"Banez points out that people are called to conserve their li ves but not by
extraordinary means involving great pain , anguish, or undertakings
di sproportionate to their state."37
Jesuit Juan Cardinal de Lugo (l 583-1660) takes Vitoria 's ideas and
develops them with different examples that are employed even today. One
of his more noteworthy illustrations, which conveys the lack of obligation
to use ordinary means that offer no hope of benefit, places a man squarely
in the face of certain death by fire.
The man notices that he has water to extinguish part of the ftre , but
not all of it, and that he can only delay his death by the water's use. Is the
man under an obligation to use the water? De Lugo answers in the
negative, "because the obligation of conserving life by ordinary means is
not an obligation of using means for such a brief conservation."38
Thi s does not mean, however, that if there were a possibility of
extinguishing the entire fire that it should not be attempted. On the
contrary, the man would be obliged to try. "The use of water would be
analogous to eating ordinary foods ... Thus, de Lugo wished to admit the
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possibility that an ordinary means need not be obligatory because the
benefit to the person is too slight to carry moral weight."39
According to de Lugo, any means used to conserve life "must give
definite hope of being proportionately useful and beneficial before it can be
called obligatory. It is noteworthy also that de Lugo applies this doctrine even
to the taking of food which is a purely natural means of conserving life."40
Alphonsus Liguori (1696-1787), though deemed an authority on this
matter, adds little that is new to the tradition taking shape at the hands of
his predecessors. His review and confirmation of what they posited is still
important nonetheless. 41 He restates what were already widely accepted
norms for assessing the duty to preserve life:
I. There is no obligation to employ expensive or "uncommon
medicines"

2. Moving to a more healthful climate is not obligatory
3. Extraordinary means, such as amputation of an extremity, are not
required

4. There is an obligation to employ ordinary interventions if the hope
of benefit exists42
Regarding the popular example of amputation as an extraordinary
means, it must be remembered that such a surgery, at a time of primitive
anesthesia, would have been considered so extreme that a patient was
almost always justified in forgoing the painful ordeal, even if it was
determined that there was a possibility of benefit. Developments in health
care have all but rendered that example useless.
Following Liguori, and throughout the nineteenth century, the writings of
moral theologians on issues related to ordinary/extraordinary means of
conserving life had become relatively unified around the four points listed
above. 43 During this time, and into the twentieth century, numerous
theologians supported the idea that there are "some non-obligatory means
that remain optional regardless of the condition of the patient."44
Hieronymus Noldin (1838-1922), for instance, says that moving to a
more healthful climate or enlisting the services of the best physicians is not
obligatory, even for a person who could easily afford it. All that is required
of anyone is the use of those means that are ordinarily employed. 45 This
same idea is found in the manual of Heribert Jone, OFM Cap. (19241999).46 Henry Davis, SJ, concurs as well. He says that although an
individual is required to employ ordinary means to preserve his life, he is
222
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not required to use "extraordinary expensive methods, nor methods that
would inflict on him almost intolerable pain or shame."47
In 1950, theologian Gerald Kelly, SJ, (1902-1964), published "The
Duty of Using Artificial Means of Preserving Life." Eighteen months later,
he followed up with "The Duty to Preserve Life." These two articles
together present a summation of the theological tradition regarding
ordinary/extraordinary means and applies that tradition to the "modern"
medical situation. In line with his predecessors, Kelly relies on hope of
benefit when it comes to assessing the obligation to preserve life.
Theologians have responded favorably to the suggestion that even an
ordinary artificial means need not be considered obligatory for a
patient when it is relatively useless ... [T]o avoid complications, it
would be well to include the notion of usefulness in the definitions of
ordinary and extraordinary means. 48

He defines ordinary and extraordinary means as follows: "Ordinary
means are all medicines, treatments, and operations, which offer a
reasonable hope of benefit and which can be obtained and used without
excessive expense, pain, or other inconvenience." Extraordinary means are
those interventions that are excessively expensive, painful, or inconvenient,
and "would not offer a reasonable hope of benefit."49
For Kelly, all patients are entitled to such things as nursing care, pain
relief, food and drink, and "the opportunity of preparing for death." There
is no moral obligation, however, to use "artificiallife-sustainers .. . unless
they offer the hope of some real benefit... without imposing a
disproportionate inconvenience."5o
Seven years later, Kelly revisited the issue in another article,
"Preserving Life," where he expanded some of his previous observations.
Like those before him, Kelly says that every person has a duty to conserve
his life through ordinary means. To do otherwise, would be suicide. For
ordinary means to be refused a patient, is equal to euthanasia. However, "It
is not always easy to distinguish between ordinary and extraordinary
means of preserving life."51
Moral theologians before Kelly knew of the difficulty in trying to
distinguish between ordinary and extraordinary means. They knew that
when making moral decisions about preserving life, avoiding evil and
doing good were their guiding principles. "[BJut there are reasonable and
proportionate limits to one's duty of doing good."52
The morali sts set out to make a prudent estimate of the limits of this
duty. In other words, they wanted to answer the simple question that
any good man might ask: "How much does God demand that I do in
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order to preserve thi s life which belongs to God and of whi ch I am
only a steward?"5]

As has been discu ssed previously, the moralists considered such
inconveniences as expense and pain when measuring one's duty to do good
when considering means for preserving life. Kelly reaffirms the idea that
inconveniences thought to be excessive " by reason of expense, pain, or
other hardship to oneself or others" are legitimately called extraordinary. 54
Among the examples of such extraordinary means, Kelly lists "intravenous
feeding to prolong life in a terminal coma."55 This appears to be a semantic
development (not a change in thinking) from what he had said in a previous
article. "Kelly wishes to consider such means ordinary, but useless,
artificial means of preserving life and so optional."56
Kelly 's question about how far one must go in trying to preserve life
is addressed by Pope Pius XII.
Normally one is held to use only ordinary means according to the
circumstances of persons, places, times and cultures - that is to say,
means that do not involve any grave burdens for oneself or another. A
more strict obligation would be too burdensome for most people and
would render the attainment of a higher, more important good too
difficult. Life, health, all temporal activities are in fact subordinated
to spiritual endsY

This statement not only reveals Pius ' embrace of the moral tradition
regarding ordinary/extraordinary means, but reflects his Christian
understanding of mortality, and that there is higher achievement than life
on earth.
Cronin wrote in his 1958 doctoral dissertation (which later became a
chapter in Conserving Human Life, published by the Pope John Center)
that "The teaching that an ordinary means of conserving life must offer a
hope of benefit is certainly in hannony with common sense. It would be
unreasonable to bind an individual with a moral obligation of employing a
remedy or cure which offers no hope of benefit. . . No one writes in
opposition to this teaching."58 He even goes so far as to say that the
ordinary intake of food (not to mention ANH) may be optional if no hope
of benefit exists. 59
Like all the others, Cronin does highlight the moral responsibility to
use ordinary means in preserv ing one's life. "Not to employ the ordinary
means of conserving life is tantamount to suicide and thu s a grave sin."60
Thi s statement, especially when it follows the one above, has led to
confusion. Cronin says that hope of benefit makes all the difference here.
"We have included the notion of utility or proportionate hope of success
224
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and benefit as an essential part of our definition of ordinary means. Any
means, therefore, that does not give definite hope of benefit is an
extraordinary means."61
So food and drink, whether taken by mouth or administered through a
gastrostomy tube, becomes an extraordinary means of conserving life
when it offers no hope of be nefi t; rendering it, therefore, optional, or not
morally obligatory. This is the approach taken by Catholic Church
hierarchy even as recently as 1995.

An Apparent Shift
The 1980 Vatican " Declaration on Euthanasia" reflects the centuriesold tradition laid out above.
[O]ne cannot impose on anyo ne the obligation to have recourse to a
tec hnique which is already in use but which canies a risk or is
burdensome. Such a refusal is not the equivalent of sui cide ; on the
contrary, it should be considered as an acceptance of the human
condition, or a wish to avoid the application of a medical procedure
disproportionate to the res ults that can be expected, or a desire not to
impose excess ive expense on the family or the community. When
inevitable death is imminent in spite of the means used, it is
permitted in conscience to take the decision to refuse forms of
treatment that would only secure a precarious and burdensome
prol ongation of life, so long as the normal care due to the sick person
in similar cases is not interrupted. 62

Fifteen years later, Pope John Paul II presented Evangelium Vitae (On
the Value and Inviolability of Human Life). Part of thi s encyclical deals
with conserving life and takes its moral cue straight from the above-cited

Declaration on Euthanasia:
In such situations. when death is clearly imminent and inev itable,
one can in conscience "refuse forms of treatment that would only
secure a precarious and burdensome prolongation of life, so long as
the normal care due to the sick person in simil ar cases is not
interrupted." Certainly there is a moral obligation to care for oneself
and to allow oneself to be cared for, but this duty must take account
of concrete circumstances. It needs to be determined whether the
means of treatment available are objectively proportionate to the
prospects for improve ment. To forego extraordinary or
di sproportionate means is not the equi valent of suicide or euthanasia ;
it rather expresses acceptance of the human condition in the face of
death. 63
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Compare this, however, to what he said only three years later:
"[T]he omission of nutrition and hydration intended to cause a patient's
death must be rejected and that, while giving careful consideration to all
factors involved, the presumption should be in favor of providing
medically assisted nutrition and hydration to all patients who need them ."64
Here, the pope is much more aligned with the Pontifical Council on Health
Affairs ' statements that appeared in the 1981 publication of Questions of
Ethics Regarding the Fatally III and the Dying, cited earlier.
Further cementing the pope's stance is his statement issued last
March. Even a bleak prognosis for recovery, "when the vegetative state
lasts longer than a year, cannot ethically justify abandoning or interrupting
basic care, including food and hydration, of a patient." Di scontinuing a
patient's nutrition and hydration "is truly euthanasia by omission."65
This most recent statement is indicative of the Church 's seeming
modification of the centuries-old moral tradition that demands the presence
of a reasonable hope of benefit (historically understood as contributing to
the healthful recovery of the patient) before obligating anyone to use
interventions for the conservation of life. Suddenly it has become a matter
of choosing between the use of ANH to keep a patient alive (with hope of
benefit being reduced to the sustaining of biological life) or withholding
ANH to cause death. The apparent shift in terminology reveals a shift
toward physicalism-that everything supervenes on the physical.
Responding to the Schiavo case, a recent statement of the
Florida bishops claims to offer clarification on "the church 's teaching
about when it is permissible to withhold or withdraw nutrition and
hydration. They have made clear that there should be a presumption in
favor of providing medically assisted nutrition and hydration as long as it is
of sufficient benefit to outweigh the burdens involved to the patient."66
While presuming in favor of ANH, however, the Florida bishops do
acknowledge the sometimes licit refusal of treatment. They specifically
cite a "burdensome prolongation of life" as reason enough to discontinue
ANH, "and that this may be properly seen as an expression of our hope in
the life to come."67
In a single paragraph the Florida bishops appear to take both sides of
the current debate surrounding the use of ANH. On one hand, there is a call
for a presumption in favor of using ANH in all cases. This appears to be a
popular line of thinking among many pro-life groups and Church officials.
On the other hand, there is an appeal for avoiding anything that can
become a burdensome prolongation of life. This is in line with the
theological tradition.
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